World of Education/World of Education.iso/world_a/afr_july.zip/AFRNEWS7.ZIP/NEWS0629.93

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                LAST UPDATE: 6-29-93 AT 8:30 A.M.


Article: 16676 of soc.culture.african
From: [e-mail] (Yusuf S. Abdi)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Subject: SOMALIA: Mandate For Change, or Business as Usual
Date: 25 Jun 1993 10:40:09 -0400


The following touches on the initial U.S. involvement in Somalia,
and provides some insight into the political culture that prevails
within the US.

This is excerpted from an article by Noam Chomsky, professor of Linguistics
and Philosophy at M.I.T.

______________________________________________________________________________

"Mandate for Change," or Business as Usual, February, 1993


3. Aiding the Pentagon
----------------------

In passing, we may note that the current PR campaign in Somalia
has similar motives [in aiding the Pentagon], a fact that is scarcely
even disguised.  The first landing was carefully staged for TV.  Pentagon
briefings directed journalists to where they were wanted, even advising
them when and where "to set up their cameras" (_New York
Times_).  Pentagon officials encouraged "extensive media coverage
in a bid to cast the US mission in the most positive light," the
_Washington Post_ reported, noting "the invasion's
made-for-Hollwood quality," which aroused considerable ridicule
in Europe, and occasionally here.  These officials were "eager to
advertise both to Somalia and the rest of the world the
precedent-setting humanitarian mission," the _Post_ reported,
omitting the quotes around the last two words that authentic
journalism would require. <<<NB: Michael Gordon, _NYT_, Dec. 10;
_WP_-_BG_, Dec. 9, 10; Alan Riding (Paris) _NYT_, Dec. 10;
William Echikson (Paris), _BG_, Dec. 11, 1992.>>>

The operation will be "a good experience for other countries and
for us to see what effect American generosity has on these types
of disaster," the overseas relief chief of USAID, Andrew Natsios,
stated: "millions of lives will be saved.  Americans should feel
very good about themselves" -- and about the Pentagon budget that
allows such miracles of generosity.  Officials "didn't hide the
fact that they wanted to make it as easy as possible for the news
media to cover an event that portrays them in a good light,"
Peter Grier reported in the _Christian Science Monitor_: "With
the military budget crumbling, a little favorable publicity can
only help." For the Marine Corps, the operation is a
"showcase...at a time when Congress is under intense pressure to
produce post-Cold War defense savings," the _Post_ commented,
and the whole affair is nothing less than "a public relations
bonanza at just the right time." JCS chairman Colin Powell added
that the effort is a "paid political advertisement" on behalf of
plans for an intervention force,  The military "convoys were more
a symbolic show for the world's television cameras than any
serious effort to get a steady stream of food moving," _New
York Times_ correspondent Jane Perlez reported two weeks after
the landing, under the heading "Somalia, We Are Here! (Now What
Do We Do?)." <<<NB: Charles Radin, _BG_, Dec. 10; Grier, _CSM_,
Dec. 11; _WP Weekly_, Dec. 14-20, 1992 (Joseph Gerson,
_Peacework_, Jan. 1993); Perlez, _NYT Week in Review_, Dec.
20, 1992.>>>

The intervention "seemed to be largely devoid of ulterior
political motives," Perlez added, a phrase that is obligatory
even in reports that bring out clearly the overriding "political
motives" and the great efforts to achieve the desired effect.
These efforts were so obvious that only the most disciplined were
able to suppress entirely what they knew and to marvel that the
intervention "was justified _solely_ on moral grounds" and thus
put "the question of idealism in foreign policy rather purely"
(_New Republic_ editors, their emphasis). <<<NB: Editorial,
_NR_, Dec. 28, 1992.>>>

The pretensions could hardly be taken seriously.  If Washington
had any humanitarian concerns for the people of Somalia, it had
ample opportunity to act upon them from 1978 through 1990, when
it was the major supporter of Siad Barre, the Saddam Hussein
clone who was then destroying Somali society, killing 50-60,000
according to Africa Watch and setting the stage for the horrors
that followed -- facts regularly finessed in current media
coverage. <<<NB: Africa Watch, _A Government at War with its
People_, Jan. 1990.  Frank Crigler, US ambassador from 1987
during the days of Siad Barre's worst atrocities, is now a
respected commentator in the press and a consultant to ABC
Nightline News on Somalia, no questions asked -- apart from
privately expressed shock.>>> There is no evidence of a sudden
religious conversion since.  Furthermore, there are numerous
"humanitarian missions" that could readily be undertaken if
generosity were even a marginal element in policy-making.  To
take a case close to home, it is agreed on all sides that a few
phone calls to the ruling Generals -- not 30,000 troops -- would
probably suffice to call off the savage terror in Haiti and allow
the return of the democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, highly popular in Haiti if not in Washington; this
minimal intervention would also save any number of infants from
starvation and disease.  Examples abound.  That aside, no one who
even pretends to be serious will lend credence to a "humanitarian
act" carefully staged for the world's TV cameras -- particularly,
when it is undertaken by a great power with a horrifying record
of abuse of human rights, and a particular penchant for imposing
starvation and disease on civilian societies by economic warfare
(Vietnam, Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, Iraq,...).

States are not moral agents. "Generosity" and "humanitarian
missions" are tools of the trade of the commissar class in every
society.  Perhaps some historical examples can be found of
"humanitarian intervention," but transparently, this is not one
of them.

As is fully recognized, the troops were sent well after the civil
society had begun to recover and the crisis was clearly receding.
"One thing is certain," Jane Perlez emphasizes: "the worst of the
Somali famine of 1992 is past." "The Worst Was Over" (a
subheading reads) well before the US forces arrived in December.
By early November, aid agencies in the distribution center in
Baidoa, where the crisis was unusually severe, reported that
about 80% of aid was reaching the most needy, and by the end of
the month, the ICRC and other experienced agencies were reporting
still higher figures.  Recovery from Siad Barre's atrocities in
the North had been substantial well before, and even in the
region of greatest violence and suffering in the South there was
visible progress, thanks in part to the efforts of the
highly-regarded UN mediator Muhammad Sahnoun, who was removed
after his public criticism of the incompetence of the UN
operations.

Serious reservations about the character of the US intervention
were expressed by development and relief agencies and the few
people really knowledgeable about Somalia and the problems of
famine, among them Rakiya Omaar, the Somali head of Africa Watch
who was dismissed when she publicly opposed the intervention, and
her co-worker Alex de Waal, one of the leading specialists on
African famines and East Africa, who resigned in protest.  The
American Friends Service Committee, which has carried out
development programs and relief work in Somalia for over ten
years and is implementing emergency programs today, concluded "on
the basis of this direct experience and our knowledge of the
country and its people" that the massive military intervention is
a "grave mistake" that "may be counterproductive in the long if
not the short run," interrupting and disrupting the processes of
reconstruction that "have been undertaken among traditional
leaders facilitated by Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun of the United
Nations and others, to try to build peace from below." Apparently
reflecting similar perceptions, the International Red Cross
(ICRC), which played by far the greatest part in responding to
the terrible famine that peaked in summer 1992, refused to accept
US military escorts for fear that this would disrupt arrangements
that had been developing within Somali civil society.  The
British government pressured Oxfam and Save the Children, both
dependent on government support, to call off their criticisms of
the intervention.

Many expressed particular concern over US dealings with the
leading "warlords," fearing that this may provide greater
legitimacy and power to the most dangerous and destructive
elements in the society.  They seem to agree.  Both General
Mohammed Farrar Aideed, the most powerful of these killers, and
his ally Col. Omar Jess, who massacred over 100 civilian leaders
in Kismayu in preparation for the arrival of the marines, "want
to deal solely with the US," Julian Ozanne comments in the
_Financial Times_, reporting on a protest by 500 demonstrators
loyal to Aideed that disrupted the visit of UN Secretary General
Boutros Ghali to Mogadishu, which Aideed controls. <<<NB: Perlez,
_NYT_, Dec. 31; Donatella Lorch, _NYT_, Dec. 20, 1992.  AFSC
statement, _Peacework_, Jan. 1993.  Rakiya Omaar, Alex de Waal,
ABC correspondent Charles Glass, personal communications.  See
_London Guardian_, Dec. 6; Alexander Cockburn, _Nation_, Dec.
21, _Wall Street Journal_, Dec. 24, 1992.  _New Statesman_,
Jan. 1, 1993, on Africa Watch.  Also Mary Dines, same issue, for
an insightful report from the southern port of Kismayo.  Aideed
demonstration, Ozanne, _FT_, Jan. 4; Tina Susman, AP, _BG_,
Jan. 4; Alison Mitchell, Paul Lewis, _NYT_, Jan. 4, 1993.>>>

There is good reason to believe that a more modulated approach in
cooperation with Somali civil society could have been effective
in enhancing the recovery already underway, along lines that have
been presented by Omaar, de Waal, and other close observers.  The
military operation that was so "eagerly advertised" may prove
beneficial or harmful to Somalis in the long run, but that is
incidental; they are basically props for photo opportunities.

In the UK, as here, it is commonly felt necessary to include ritual
phrases about the "humanitarian mission" in analyses of actual
motives.  Economic correspondent Michael Prowse of the
_Financial Times_ describes the Somali intervention in these
terms: "in the absence of the communist threat, the most reliable
way to sustain public support for large military expenditures may
be to base foreign policy on values the public holds dear.  In
today's changed world [the Soviet threat having vanished], Mr
Clinton is thus being a realist, as much as an idealist, in
pledging to make the promotion of democracy and human rights the
guiding principles for overseas interventions" -- PR devices that
he did not invent, of course.  Having exposed the propaganda,
Prowse goes on to laud "The heartwarming presence of US troops in
Somalia," where, "For the first time in recent US history
(perhaps ever), a sizeable military intervention overseas was
justified on purely moral grounds." A high tolerance for
self-contradiction is a virtual necessity for intellectual
respectability, given the need to invest the actual workings of
power with suitable majesty.

The day after the intervention, in an article on the US economy
not mentioning Somalia, Prowse cited US economists in corporate
and financial institutions who attribute the sluggishness of
recovery from the recession to the decline in military spending,
which eliminates a traditional device for stimulating the
economy.  In brief, the stakes in "sustaining public support for
large military expenditures" are high. <<<NB: Prowse, _FT_, Dec.
21, 9, 1992.>>>

According to the official version of the timing, presented most
fully by Don Oberdorder of the _Washington Post_ on the basis
of official leaks, the decision to intervene was taken on
November 21 on the grounds that "the need is crying" and "only
the United States can do something." <<<NB: _WP Weekly_, Dec.
14-20, 1992.>>> That story lacks any credibility; "the need was
crying" months earlier, and was declining by late November thanks
to the efforts of others.

It is possible that the intervention had been planned for the
post-election period.  In early November, a marine colonel in
civilian clothes was seen by reporters in Baidoa, apparently
scouting out the area where a major base would be established; at
the time, US military personnel were restricted to the cargo
planes delivering supplies.  A "humanitarian intervention" just
before election day would have seemed too cynical a ploy,
undermining the PR function.  An earlier intervention would have
faced two problems.  The first is that the situation had not yet
begun to settle.  The operation would have been far more risky,
and it was not so obvious then that the appearance of success
could be quickly achieved; similar considerations rule out
"humanitarian intervention" in Bosnia, even more strongly.
Second, it is widely felt that things might go sour after the
initial PR bonanza, and the administration surely did not want to
face such problems under the glare of election klieglights.  The
post-election timing is preferable.  Order was being restored so
the appearance of success is more likely.  Bush's term can end in
a blaze of glory.  If the "purely idealistic" effort turns into
the usual disaster, on the model of Grenada, Panama, and so on,
attention will have waned or someone else will have to pick up
the pieces and suffer the political consequences.

As in earlier efforts to sustain the Pentagon system, the Somali
intervention may serve other purposes.  The US supported Siad
Barre through his worst atrocities because of its interest in
Somali bases for the intervention forces aimed at the Middle East
and for possible operations in Africa; such considerations might
remain of some importance (not much, I suspect, alternatives
being readily available).  Furthermore, in large parts of Africa
and the Middle East the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (which may
well be accelerated by the intervention) is a matter of growing
concern, for traditional reasons: like secular nationalist
tendencies, liberation theology, labor and peasant organizing,
democratic socialist political initiatives, some military
regimes, and other potentially independent forces, Islamic
fundamentalism falls under the rubric of "ultranationalism," a
term that covers any threat of deviation from the subordinate
role assigned to the service areas, whatever its political
coloration.  Nevertheless, it seems likely that at the current
moment, the prevailing factor is the domestic one, the crisis of
state industrial policy, as the more serious commentary and
reporting often indicates obliquely.

End of part 3 of 5
===============================================================
This article by Noam Chomsky appeared in the February 1993 issue of
Z Magazine and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.

According to the publishers, Z is an independent, progressive
monthly magazine of critical thinking on  political, cultural,
social, and economic life in the United States.  It sees the
racial, sexual, class, and political dimensions of  personal life
as fundamental to
understanding and improving contemporary circumstances; and it
aims to assist activist efforts to attain a better future.

Z Magazine is published monthly except on issue for July/August
by the Institute for Social and Cultural Communications.
Subscriptions: One Year $25; Two Years $40; Three Years $55;
Canada and Mexico $40/year; students/low income $18/yr; foreign
(surface) $50.  You can write to: Z Magazine, 150 W Canton St.,
Boston MA 02118, [phone], Fax: [phone].

Each issue of the magazine is about 100 pages with no
advertisements.

=================================================================

--
====== Yusuf


From uwvax!uwm.edu!wupost!uunet!portal!lbueno Tue Jun 29 08:01:43 CDT 1993
Article: 16695 of soc.culture.african
Xref: uwvax soc.culture.african:16695 alt.discrimination:9656
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african,alt.discrimination
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!wupost!uunet!portal!lbueno
From: [e-mail] (Louis Alberto Bueno)
Subject: WHITE EXTREMISTS FORCE THEIR WAY INTO SITE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail]
Nntp-Posting-Host: jobe.unix.portal.com
Organization: Portal Communications Company
Date: Sat, 26 Jun 1993 07:18:57 GMT
Lines: 85

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    WHITE EXTREMISTS FORCE THEIR WAY INTO SITE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS

    By Paul Taylor
    The Washington Post, June 25, 1993

    JOHANNESBURG, South Africa -- Hundreds of heavily armed white
right-wingers used an armored truck to smash their way into the building
where South Africa's multi-party democracy talks were being held Friday and
occupied the main negotiating chamber for two hours.
    Although the negotiations swiftly resumed, the dramatic protest had
its intended effect. It showed the frustration level of the radical fringe
of Afrikaners, descendants of South Africa's original white settlers, as
the country moves toward its first all-races election tentatively scheduled
to take place next April 27.
    "If they don't make a place for the Afrikaner, then they are
declaring war on the Afrikaner," said Eugene Terre'Blanche, who led the
assault on the building clad in a camouflage uniform and a gold-braided
general's cap. "Let Yugoslavia be a lesson."
    A contingent of about 600 police made no effort to defend the
building against the military-style takeover by uniformed members of the
neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement, Terre'Blanche's group, demanding
that post-apartheid South Africa include a separate nation for the whites
descended from the Dutch, German and French Huguenot settlers who began to
arrive here in the 17th century.
    The acquiescent response of the police touched off an immediate
furor between the white-minority government, which said the officers'
restraint saved untold lives, and black liberation organizations, which
charged that the police would have behaved far differently had the
demonstrators been black.
    Nonetheless, the government and the black groups were united in
denouncing the protesters, who targeted the symbolic engine room of
post-apartheid South Africa to deliver their message that Afrikaners "will
not be sold down the river," as one demonstrator put it, by the
negotiations for black majority rule.
    After their leaders drove a small armored truck through a
plate-glass facade, then past a cordon of police in the building's foyer,
stopping at the foot of an escalator, about 400 militant right-wingers
streamed into the second-floor negotiation chamber, where morning
proceedings among 26 participating organizations were about to begin.
    The armed demonstrators, whose weapons included rifles, shotguns
and pistols, shouted racial epithets, jostled black delegates and
journalists, spray-painted political slogans on walls and scattered papers
of the delegates whose desks they occupied. Top government and political
leaders barricaded themselves in side rooms for safety.
    The protesters eventually were persuaded to leave peacefully when
government negotiators assured their leaders that there would be not be any
arrests on the spot.
    Friday night, however, President Frederik W. de Klerk vowed that
all those who took part in the takeover would be arrested and prosecuted.
He called the demonstration "despicable" and denied allegations that
"police act differently when blacks are involved." He said a strong-armed
response would have led to bloodshed.
    The episode ended without any serious injuries, and proved to be
only a temporary setback to the negotiating process. By mid-afternoon,
delegates were back in their seats. The first item of discussion: new
security arrangements.
    The demonstration had been organized by an umbrella group of
Afrikaner groups, including the Conservative Party, which is a participant
in the negotiations, and the Afrikaner Volksfront, a newly formed coalition
that says it is committed to non-violent means to achieve its objective of
Afrikaner self-determination.
    Leaders of the two organizations condemned the takeover of the
building, insisting they had no idea that the Afrikaner Resistance Movement
-- the most militant member of their alliance -- was planning to do so. An
estimated 2,500 demonstrators had gathered outside for a planned rally, and
only a fraction actually entered the building.
    "We cannot condone the damage to property, the assaults, the foul
language. ... We apologize," said Constand Viljoen, the retired head of the
South African Defense Force who chairs the Afrikaner Volksfront. But he
also said the takeover constituted a warning. "The Afrikaner people built
this country, we tamed this country, we have a right to be here," Viljoen
said.
    His group has called for negotiations to be suspended until
Afrikaners can devise a proposal on the form of a new Afrikaner state. The
government and the African National Congress, the two most powerful
negotiating parties, have made clear that they intend to push ahead and
ratify next week the tentatively approved April 27 election date for a
non-racial transition government. They do not envision a separate Afrikaner
state, in part because Afrikaners comprise just 8 percent of the population
and do not come close to constituting a majority in any region of the
country.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


From uwvax!uwm.edu!spool.mu.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!agate!headwall.Stanford.EDU!nntp.Stanford.EDU!dianazon Tue Jun 29 08:02:53 CDT 1993
Article: 16697 of soc.culture.african
Xref: uwvax soc.culture.african:16697 soc.culture.african.american:29097
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african,soc.culture.african.american
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From: [e-mail] (copacetic fig for life)
Subject: MALIDOMA SOME (BURKINA FASO AUTHOR SPEAKS LOCALLY)
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Mr News)
Organization: Stanford University, California
 just forwarding:
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BURKINA FASO WRITER AT PRINTERS INC. BOOKSTORE.
310 California Ave. Palo Alto  327-6500

July 29, 1993.  Thursday, 8 PM

Discusses his book, RITUAL.
MALIDOMA SOME talks about his upbringing among the elders of the
Dagara tribe in West Africa and about the ancient rituals that helped
hold the community together.

He also argues that the lack of ritual in Western culture has left
many of us empty, lonely, and separate and that we have a great deal
to learn from the traditional practices of indigenous peoples.

Raised in a small village in Burkina Faso, Malidoma Some was initiated
into the ancestral tribal traditions and is a medicine man in the
Dagara culture.  He also holds graduate degrees from the Sorbonne and
Brandeis University.

Above taken from Printers Inc. brochure.
--------------
sorry if the above had already been posted on the net. I haven't had time to
peruse all the articles to double-check. Please forward this to pertinent
newsgroups and persons.

Thanks,
Ify


--
------
  "Our women have very big nipples. Sweet and big." -Kwesi Brew
     Ndi be anyi kwenu! He! Kwenu! He! Kwenu! He! Kwenu! He!


From uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!gatech!destroyer!cs.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!pharaoh Tue Jun 29 08:07:31 CDT 1993
Article: 16729 of soc.culture.african
Xref: uwvax soc.culture.african:16729 rec.sport.soccer:51224
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!cs.utexas.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!gatech!destroyer!cs.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!pharaoh
From: [e-mail] (Pharaoh Sianangama)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african,rec.sport.soccer
Subject: African Soccer : WQ Round 1 Revisited!
Date: 28 Jun 93 01:55:13 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
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Keywords: soccer, african

I recall sometime back a netter enquiring about WCQ first round results,
following is the full account of the results

Group A

                 PTS P  W  D  L  F  A  Diff
                ---  -  -  -  -  -  -  ----
Algeria                       5  4  2  1  1  5  4  + 1
Ghana                         4  4  2  0  2  4  3  + 1
Burundi                       3  4  1  1  2  2  4  - 2

Algeria-Burundi 3-1; Burundi-Ghana 1-0; Ghana-Algeria 2-0;
Burundi-Algeria 0-0; Ghana-Burundi 1-0; Algeria-Ghana 2-1.

GROUP B

Cameroon                      6  4  2  2  0  7  1  + 6
Swaziland                     3  3  1  1  1  1  5  - 4
Zaire                         1  3  0  1  2  1  3  - 2

Zaire-Liberia 4-2; Cameroon-Swazi 5-0; Swazi-Zaire 1-0
Zaire-Cameroon 1-2; Swazi-Cameroon 0-0; Cameroon-Zaire 0-0
Zaire-Swazi :postponed due to political unrest

Liberia withdrew from the competition, match results against Zaire
were nullified

GROUP C

Zimbabwe                      9  6  4  1  1  9  6  + 3
Egypt                         9  6  4  1  1 11  4  + 7
Angola                        4  5  1  2  2  2  3  - 1
Togo                          0  5  0  0  5  1 12  -11*

*This line differs from the source material due to the inclusion of
results from one additional game. One other game played against Angola
was postponed.

Zimbabwe-Togo 1-0; Egypt-Angola 1-0; Togo-Egypt 1-4; Zimbabwe-Egypt 2-1
Angola-Zimbabwe 1-1; Togo-Zimbabwe 1-2; Angola-Egypt 0-0; Egypt-Angola 3-0;
Zimbabwe-Angola 2-1; Angola-Togo ppd; Egypt-Zimbabwe 2-1; Togo-Angola 1-2

GROUP D

Nigeria                       7  4  3  1  0  7  0  + 7
S. Africa                     5  4  2  1  1  2  4  - 2
Congo                         0  4  0  0  4  0  5  - 5

Nigeria-S.Africa 4-0; RSA-Congo 1-0; Congo-Nigeria 0-1; RSA-Nigeria 0-0;
Congo-RSA 0-1; Nigeria-Congo 2-1.

GROUP E

C. Ivoire                     6  4  2  2  0  7  0  + 7
Niger                         5  4  2  1  1  3  2  + 1
Botswana                      1  4  0  1  3  1  9  - 8

C. Ivoire-Botswana 6-0; Niger-C.Ivoire 0-0; BOtswana-Niger 0-1;
Botswana-C.Ivoire 0-0; C.Ivoire-Niger 1-0; Niger-Botswana 2-1

GROUP F

Morroco                      10  6  4  2  0 13  1 +12
Tunisia                       9  6  3  3  0 14  2 +12
Ethiopia                      3  6  1  1  4  3 11 - 8
Benin                         2  6  1  0  5  3 19 -16

Morocco-Ethiopia 5-0; Tunisia-Benin 5-1; Benin-Morocco 0-1;
Ethiopia-Tunisia 0-0; Ethiopia-Benin 3-1; Tunisia-Morocco 1-1;
Benin-Tunisia 0-5; Ethiopia-Morocco 0-1; Morocco-Benin 5-0;
Tunisia-Ethiopia 3-0; Benin-Ethiopia 1-0; Tunisia-Morocco 0-0

GROUP G

Senegal                       6  4  3  0  1 10  4  + 6
Gabon                         5  4  2  1  1  7  5  + 2
Mozambique                    1  4  0  1  3  3 11  - 8

Gabon-Moz'que 3-1; Moz'que-Senegal 0-1; Gabon-Senegal 3-2;
Moz'que-Gabon 1-1; Senegal-Moz'que 6-1; Senegal-Gabon 1-0

GROUP H

Zambia                        6  4  3  0  1 11  3  + 8
Madagascar                    6  4  3  0  1  7  3  + 4
Namibia                       0  4  0  0  4  0 12  -12

Mad'scar-Namibia 3-0; Namibia-Zambia 0-4; Mad'scar-Zambia 2-0;
Namibia-Mad'scar 0-1; Zambia-Namibia 4-0; Zambia-Mad'scar 3-1

(Zambia-Tanzania 2-0; Tanzania-Mad'scar 0-0; Tanzania-Namibia 2-0;
(Tanzania-Zambia 1-3 were nullified due the withdrawal of Tanzania).

GROUP I

Guinea                        2  2  1  0  1  4  2  + 2
Kenya                         2  2  1  0  1  2  4  - 2

Guinea-Kenya 4-0; Kenya-Guinea 2-0

(Mauritania and Mali withdrew)



Meanwhile, the remaining games in round two are to be played over
the weekends of July 2/3/4 Group A: Nigeria-Algeria; Group B : Zambia-Morocco;
Group C: Zimbabwe-Cameroon

July 16/17/18
Group A: C.Ivoire-Algeria; Group B: Senegal-Morocco; Group C: Guinea-Cameroon

August 8: Senegal-Zambia (rescheduled game)

September 24/25/26
Group A: Nigeria-C.Ivoire; Group B: Zambia-Senegal; Group C: Cameroon-Zimbabwe

October 8/9/10
Group A: Algeria-Nigeria; Group B: Morocco-Zambia; Group C: Cameroon-Zimbabwe

The current table standings look something like this:

Group A

C.Ivoire      3  2  1  1  0  3  2 + 1
Algeria       1  1  0  1  0  1  1   0
Nigeria       0  1  0  0  1  1  2 - 1

Group B

Morocco       2  1  1  0  0  1  0  + 1
Zambia        0  0  0  0  0  0  0    0
Senegal       0  1  0  0  1  0  1  - 1

Group C

Cameroon      2  1  1  0  0  3  1  + 2
Guinea        2  2  1  0  1  3  3    0
Zimbabwe      0  1  0  0  1  0  3  - 3

Goodluck next weekend to all involved.

**************************PC Sianangama*************************
Pharaoh Collins Sianangama          [e-mail]
Depertment of Animal Science, Univerisity of British Columbia
Vancouver, B C, Canada, Tel: [phone]
****************************************************************


From uwvax!uwm.edu!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!uunet!destroyer!cs.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!pharaoh Tue Jun 29 08:10:11 CDT 1993
Article: 16749 of soc.culture.african
Xref: uwvax rec.sport.soccer:51268 soc.culture.african:16749
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!noc.near.net!uunet!destroyer!cs.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!unixg.ubc.ca!pharaoh
From: [e-mail] (Pharaoh Sianangama)
Newsgroups: rec.sport.soccer,soc.culture.african
Subject: The "other" Cup Qualifying Rounds : The Road to Tunisia
Date: 28 Jun 93 17:07:59 GMT
Organization: The University of British Columbia
Lines: 115
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
NNTP-Posting-Host: unixg.ubc.ca
Keywords: soccer Tunisia africa nations cup

The Africa Cup 94 scheduled for Tunisia (March 94) once again is suffering
from the WCQ syndrome. Some countries withdraw from this continental
competition, opting instead, to contest for places to represent Africa at
the world cup. Next year's competition is no exception. This trend has
prompted *some* to suggest that the two qualifying rounds be merged into
one, such that who ever lifts the africa cup goes on to represent africa
along with the runners up and the third place team. This, it is argued,
will save many a country the foreign currency that is currently the main
culprit sighted by those withdrawing. What do *netters* think about the
proposed discontinuation of the *africa cup*?

Meanwhile, here are the teams still in the running for the *trip* to
Tunisia.

Group 1
             PTS  P  W  D  L  F  A  Dif
Gabon                  6  4  2  2  0  5  1  + 4
Niger                  5  4  2  1  1  7  5  + 2
Cameroon               5  4  1  3  0  2  0  - 2
Benin                  0  4  0  0  4  2 10  - 8

Benin-Niger 1-2; Gabon-Cameroon 0-0; Cameroon-Benin 2-0; Niger-Gabon 1-3;
Gabon-Benin 2-0; Niger-Cameroon 0-0; Niger-Benin 4-1; Cameroon-Gabon 0-0

Group 2

Nigeria                5  4  2  1  1  6  1  + 5
Ethiopia               5  4  2  1  1  7  5  + 2
Uganda                 4  4  1  2  1  6  6    0
Sudan                  2  4  0  2  2  1  8  - 7

Uganda-Ethiopia 3-1; Sudan-Nigeria 0-0; Nigeria-Uganda 2-0; Ethiopia-Sudan 3-0
Sudan-Uganda 1-1; Ethiopia-Nigeria 1-0; Nigeria-Sudan 4-0; Ethiopia-Uganda 2-2

Group 3

Algeria               10  7  4  2  1 13  4  + 9
S.Leone               10  6  4  2  0  8  0  + 8
Senegal                7  6  3  1  2 10  5  + 5
Togo                   4  6  0  4  2  1  7  - 6
G.Bissau               1  7  0  1  6  2 18  -16

Algeria-G.Bissau 3-1; Senegal-Togo 2-0; S.Leone-Algeria 1-0; Senegal-G.Bissau
3-0; Togo-Algeria 0-0; G.Bissau-S.Leone 0-3; S.Leone-Senegal 2-0;
Togo-G.Bissau 0-0; Senegal-Algeria 1-2; S.Leone-Togo 0-0; G.Bissau-Algeria 1-4
Togo-Senegal 1-1; Algeria-S.Leone 0-0; G.Bissau-Senegal 0-3; Algeria-Togo 4-0;
S.Leone-G.Bissau 2-0

Group 4

Zaire                  6  4  2  2  0  6  2  + 4
Kenya                  4  4  1  2  1  6  5  + 1
Mozambique             4  4  1  2  1  3  2  + 1
Lesotho                2  4  0  2  2  3  9  - 6

Zaire-Moz'que 2-0; Lesotho-Kenya 2-2; Kenya-Zaire 1-3; Moz'que-Lesotho 3-0;
Moz'que-Kenya 0-0; Lesotho-Zaire 1-1; Kenya-Lesotho 3-0; Moz'que-Zaire 0-0

Group  5

Zambia                 7  4  3  1  0  6  1  + 5
Zimbabwe               6  4  2  2  0  6  2  + 4
South Africa           2  4  0  2  2  2  6  - 4
Mauritius              1  4  0  1  3  1  6  - 5

Zambia-Mauritius 2-1; Zimb'we-RSA 4-1; Mauri'us-Zimb'we 0-1; RSA-Zambia 0-1;
RSA-Mauri'us 0-0; Zambia-Zimb'we 0-0; RSA-Zimb'we 1-1; Mauri'us-Zambia 0-3

Group  6

Burundi                4  3  1  2  0  3  2  + 1
Guinea                 3  2  1  1  0  3  2  + 1
Congo                  1  3  0  1  2  0  2  - 2
*Chad was disqualified and all matches played were nullified

Burundi-Congo 1-0; Chad-Guinea 0-3*; Congo-Chad 2-0*; Guinea-Burundi 2-2;
Guinea-Congo 1-0; Congo-Burundi 0-0;

Group  7

Ghana                  2  1  1  0  0  1  0  + 1
Liberia                0  1  0  0  1  0  1  - 1
*Tanzania and Burkina Faso withdrew; games nullified

Tanzania-Ghana 2-2*; B.Faso-Liberia 1-1*; Ghana-B.Faso 3-0*; Liberia-Tanzania
1-1*; Ghana-Liberia 1-0

Group 8

Egypt                  5  4  2  1  1  4  2  + 2
Malawi                 5  4  2  1  1  3  3    0
Mali                   3  4  1  1  2  4  5  - 1
Morocco                3  4  1  1  2  2  3  - 1
*Libya withdrew

Malawi-Egypt 1-0; Malawi-Mali 1-1; Mali-Morocco 2-1; Morocco-Egypt 0-0;
Egypt-Mali 2-1; Morocco-Malawi 0-1; Morocco-Mali 1-0; Egypt-Malawi 2-0


One team will qualify from each of groups 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 (total 6 teams)
while two teams will qualify from groups 3 and 8 (total 4). Two automatic
qualifications are Tunisia (host nation) and Cote d'Ivoire (defending
champions). Therefore, 12 teams will converge on Tunis come next March.
Goodluck to all still in contention!!!


Source: African Soccer; Number 3: June-August 1993 p 6!

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PCS <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
Pharaoh Collins Sianangama        [e-mail]
University of British Columbia, Department of Animal Science
Vancouver, B C., Canada
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>




From uwvax!uwm.edu!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!gatech!rutgers!andromeda.rutgers.edu!detrolio Tue Jun 29 08:10:27 CDT 1993
Article: 16751 of soc.culture.african
Path: uwvax!uwm.edu!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!gatech!rutgers!andromeda.rutgers.edu!detrolio
From: [e-mail] (David De Trolio)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.african
Subject: Observations on the South African right-wing
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 28 Jun 93 19:36:31 GMT
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.
Lines: 49

Having watched the events in South Africa over the last few years and being
a student of South African studies, the right-wing of the country has always
been a source of interest.

The main point which keeps appearing is their ability to surface and make
some semi-political noise then disappear from public and media view.  About
the only coverage of the right-wing (AWB, Boer Commandos, etc) prior to the
incident last week was some scattered photos and footage of them in training
and in a large assembly in Pretoria.

Another aspect comes to mind, that is the element of gun control in South
Africa.  I do not know the full nature of the laws governing gun control in
South Africa, but assault weapons and automatic weapons in many areas of the
country are illegal here in the United States.  How is it most of these
organization are able to own and display automatic weapons, and possess
weapons and display them for what is not totally self-defense.

As these groups grow larger and attract more and more members, it will be
something both those involved in reform talks and the next State President
must address.  It was reported on Sunday here in the USA the ANC rejects all
talks and ideas of a white homeland in South Africa.  To many in the ranks of
the right, no doubt this may be their idea of a call to arms.

Most every country has these types of organizations and groups, especially
here in the US.  But the situation and changes present and coming to South
Africa is unique, and will present challenges and problems which some may
address through violence.

The South Africa Police and the SADF were probably wise to step back and not
attempt to use any force to stop the recent incident.  This could have cost
lives, and could have been the beginning of major unrest in all areas of the
country, and totally destroy all chances of a peaceful reform and foreign
investment into South Africa.

However, if attacks from either side occur again, police and military
forces will have to keep order, but accomplish this without seeming to
take sides or incurring loss of life.  The picture most of the world and
anyone with a dislike of the De Klerk Government expects to see is one
which resembles Soweto or Sharpville.  This is an image which cannot
be seen, and the type of incident South Africa cannot afford.




--
David De Trolio                         ([e-mail])
---------------                         --------------------------------
Nevermind where is Waldo, where are they hiding Al Gore?
Wow!!!  He actually turned up...and is moving and speaking!!!